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GENERAL NOTES
In this brief, appellant Patricia J. Thompson, now known as Patricia J. Bell, uses the
same terminology as she did in her first brief in this appeal. Hence, Patricia Bell is called
"Bell" and respondent Ronald L. Thompson is called "Thompson" throughout this brief.
Any reference to Bell's first brief in this appeal is by means of the "Opening Brief". All
references to Thompson's brief on appeal are by means of the "Respondent's Brief'.
Undersigned counsel acknowledges, and apologizes for the error in Section I of his
argument on pages 8 and 9 of the Opening Brief. The authority relied upon by Bell in that
section of her brief has been overturned by Losserv. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d
758 (2008).

The District Court's decision is now the proper focus of this appeal.

Reisenauer v. State Dep't of Transportation, 145 Idaho 948, 188 P.3d 890 (2008).
However, the change of focus mandated by the reversal by the Supreme Court of its longstanding precedent does not change the substance of Bell's arguments for the reasons
detailed on pages 14 through 17 of the Opening Brief.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
Given the Change of Focus Mandated by Reisenauer v. State Dep't of

Transportation, supra, Bell restates the issues on appeal as follows:
I.
Did the District Court err in concluding that Counts One and Two of plaintiff's motion
to enforce the Judgment failed to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief?
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11.
Did the District Court err in its conclusion that no purpose would be served by
allowing time for discovery in this case?

111.
Did the District Court err in awarding attorney fees to Thompson?
ARGUMENT

I. The District Court Erred in Concluding that Counts I and II of Bell's Motion
to Enforce the Judgment Failed to State a Claim Upon
Which the Court could Grant Relief.
When the Supreme Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to Rule
502(A) of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, it applies the same standard of review
that it applies to a motion for summary judgment. Dismissal is appropriate only when the
pleadings, affidavits and discovery documents before the court indicate that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. The moving party carries the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho
117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor
of the non-moving party, the court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The
issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to
offer evidence to support her claims. Losser v. Bradstreet, supra.
In Respondent's Brief, Thompson argued:
"[Bell's] claims in Counts One and Two of her Motion are based upon
Ronald's [Thompson's] failure to pay the premium for the term life insurance
policy upon his life after entry of the Judgment, and his failure to [Bell] that
he was not paying the premium, or did not pay the premium after entry of the
-2-

Judgment.
****

[Bell] does not allege that [Thompson] took any affirmative acts to thwart her
payment of the policy in question. She does not allege that she was unable
to contact the insu ranee company to determine the status of the pol icy .... [I]t
was her sole responsibility to check on the policy status ....
****

In the present case, [Bell] has alleged that she lost the term life insurance
policy on [Thompson's] life because the policy lapsed after the entry of the
Judgment for failure to pay a premium that she alone was responsible for.
****

No matter what her discovery found, it would not change the outcome of the
case because [Thompson] owed no duty to [Bell] after entry of the Judgment
with respect to the term life insurance policy."
Respondent's Brief pages 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13.
This argument ignores the following portions of Bell's motion for relief from judgment
and for modification of judgment:
"4.
After the entry of the stipulation on July 23, 2013, and before
the entry of the Decree on August 21, 2013, plaintiff made inquiry of State
Farm regarding the status of the policy and was told that the annual premium
on the policy, covering the year running from August of 2013 to August of
2014, had already been paid.
5.
In June of 2014, when plaintiff made inquiry regarding the
payment of the next year's premium on the insurance policy, she was told
that the policy was no longer in effect on account of the non-payment of
premiums.
6.
After inquiry to defendant, through his attorney, regarding the
policy, defendant's attorney stated in a letter dated July 15, 2014, that the
policy had expired on September 26, 2013, and that the premiums had never
been paid through August of 2014.
7.
If the facts stated by defendant's attorney in the letter of July
15, 2014, are correct, defendant allowed the insurance policy to lapse
without providing plaintiff with any notice that the premiums were due, which
would have allowed her to pay the premium and preserve the value of the
asset. If the facts stated by the State Farm representative to plaintiff in July
or August of 2013, are correct, defendant withdrew the payment of the
premium and then allowed the policy to lapse without providing plaintiff with
any notice that premiums were due, which would still have allowed her to pay
the premium and preserve the value of the asset. In either event, defendant
acted willfully with the intention of depriving plaintiff of the most significant
financial benefit to which she was entitled pursuant to the terms of the
-3-

stipulation and the Decree, which constitutes a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that is a part of the stipulation between the
parties. The breach of that covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a
breach of the terms of the contract that is the stipulation. The same acts
may, depending upon the timing of the events, also constitute a breach of
the fiduciary duty that defendant owed to plaintiff, his spouse."
R., pp. 86-87.
These allegations belie the claim on page 8 of Respondent's Brief to the effect that
Bell's only claims were based upon Thompson's failure to pay the premium for the term life
insurance policy after entry of the Judgment and his failure to tell Bell that he was not
paying the premiums. In fact, Bell's allegations went far beyond that by asserting, in
paragraph 5 of her motion for relief from judgment, R., 87, that the community had paid for
the insurance through August of 2014. In paragraph 7 of the motion, R., 87, she further
alleged that Thompson had revoked the payment of the premiums on the policy and then
allowed it to lapse in 2013, after agreeing that the community asset would be awarded to
Bell.
If the premium on the life insurance policy had in fact been paid through August of
2014, the community interest in the policy did not lapse until that time. Banner Life Ins. Co.

v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, supra.

That community asset had been

awarded to Bell by the terms of the Judgment. R., p.37. Thus, by the authority cited in
Thompson's own brief, Bell alleged the misappropriation or destruction of a community
asset that had been awarded to her, with resulting claims for equitable and monetary relief.
The only uncertainty is when the misappropriation occurred. If it occurred before entry of
the Judgment, Bell's allegations regarding breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing are entirely to the point, because until the entry of
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the Judgment, the relations between the parties were controlled by the stipulation. And,
if it occurred after entry of the Judgment, Thompson breached the duty, as stated by the
District Court, "to stay out of [Bell's] way", R., p.195, by misappropriating or destroying the
asset that had been assigned to her.
Whether the misappropriation occurred before or after the entry of Judgment, Bell's
allegations contradict the claim on page 9 of Respondent's Brief that she had not alleged
any affirmative action by Thompson thwarting her continued payment of the premiums
required by the policy. Thus, contrary to the claim on page 11 of Respondent's Brief, Bell
has alleged that Thompson's actions in revoking the community's payment of the premium
required through August of 2014 were the cause of the lapse of the policy in September
of 2013.
All of these allegations contradict the claim on page 13 of Respondent's Brief that
discovery would not change the outcome of the case. In fact, that discovery might well
have substantiated the allegations of paragraphs 4 through 7 of Bell's motion, thus
establishing the breach of duties owed by Thompson to Bell before and/or after entry of the
Judgment.
The District Court erred both in ignoring the substance of these allegations (They
were, in fact, not even mentioned in his decision. R., pp. 191-206) and in affirming the
Magistrate's refusal to allow Bell the opportunity to discover the facts that would allow her
to prove them. The issue on the motion to dismiss was not whether Bell would in fact
prevail, but whether she had stated a potential claim on which she was entitled to present
evidence. The analysis set forth in Bell's Opening Brief and in this document demonstrates
that she crossed that hurdle.
-5-

The error by the District Court in analyzing Bell's allegations is sufficient, by itself,
to necessitate the reversal of the award of attorney fees. And, in any event, as stated in
the Opening Brief, it must be conceded that there was more to Bell's motion than was
perceived by the District Court. As indicated above, his opinion does not even mention the
allegations that the community asset had been misappropriated or destroyed by
Thompson. That "more" precludes the conclusion that the appeal was frivolous.
SUMMARY

The decision by the District Court should be reversed in all respects. The case
should be remanded to that court with directions to remand the action to the Magistrate to
permit discovery and then to resolve the case on its merits.
DATED this 2."ftlday of April, 2017.
STROTHER LAW OFFICE

~ LL~

Jeff~tfstrother
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